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Abstract
A theory oC endogenoua growth ia based on an inveatment poseibility function, relating
the ratio of grosa investment to the growth rates of output and employment. Conaumers
rnaximise an intertemporal utility function and producere maximiae the value of the firm.
The long-run rate of growth depende on conaumer preferencee, the exogenous growth of
labour aupply and the degree of monopoly. The functional distribution of income ia deter-
minod along with lhe inveatment ratio in the steady etate. Labour market imperfectiona
aud rral wagc iucrtía inducc tranaiWou pruceastxi, which are importanl. for mcdium tcrm
growth. Ilysteresia and union power give riae to long-run unemployment.
-'We are indebted to Frederick van der Plorg, Anton van Schaik, Maurice Scott and ]uques Smulders tor
their valuable comments on an earlier version. O( course, the uaual diaclaimer applies.
~P.O.f3ox 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands1 Introduction
A dissatisfaction with neoclassical growth theory of the sixties has led to a
revival of the theory of economic growth. Neoclassical theory developed by
Solow (1956) and Sw:Ln (1956) builds upon diminishing returns of factors
of production. If one factor can be accumulated and the other factor is
exogenous economic growth in the long run depends entirely on exogenous
factors, for instance the growth rate of labour supply and the growth rate
in labour efhciency (technological change). The new growth theory (en-
dogenous growth theory as it is often called) introduces different devices to
overcome diminishing returns of the reproducible factor. There are now a
number of useful surveys that compare the different approaches taken (e.g.
Romer, 1989; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1990; Sala-i-Martin, 1990).
Endogenous growth theories take a more realistic view of the production
process in the economy by allowing non-decreasing returns with respect to
reproducible factors. Whereas in neoclassical theory physical capital is the
only reproducible factor, the new growth theory takes a broader view by
including human capital (explicitly or implicitly) as a reproducible factor
of procluction (e.g. Lucas, 1988; King and Rebelo, 1990). Assuming non-
decreasing returns with respect to accumulated factors of production the
long-run growth rates depend on intertemporal preferences for consumption.
Countries with ide.ntical structures will grow at the same rate, but there is no
convergence to a unique level oí output as there is in the neoclassical theory.
These results of endogenous growth theory seem more in line with empirical
observations, although this claim is not undisputed (see for instance Mankiw,
Romer and Weil, 1990).
'fhere are a number of interesting extensions of the new growth theory.
ILesearch and development activities may be directed at innovating new
intermediate products, which may be used in turn to increase the production
of final goods. Diminishing returns with respect to different types of capital
goods in the final goode producing sector are then counterbalanced by adding
new types to the set of inputs (e.g. Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman,
1989). There are other specifications of the RBtD process which give similar
results (e.g. Helpman and Grossman, 1989). What these models have in
common is that they spell out production activities in some detail by way
of examples that illustrate the endogeneity of accumulation.
Here we take a different route by emphasising change as such. Produc-
tion at a point in time is a singular event, determined by past history. What
matters more is that the world is in a constant flux, because people changez
thinqs by investing in mauy different ways. Following ideas put forward by
Scott (1989) in a seminal book on economic growth we assume that gross
investment always implies change and never mere reduplication of existing
processes r. Econornic evolution and learning are two sides of the same coin.
On a micrceconomic level there may be merit in modelling specific activities
like RBcD, institutional learning, etc. On a macrceconomic level it may suf-
fice to assume a relation between gross investment (consumption foregone)
and the growth rates of output and employment. Such a relation, which
will be introduced more formally in the next section, is reminiscent of eaz-
lier attempts like Kaldor's technical progress function (Kaldor, 1957) or the
Kennedy-Samuelson-Weiszacker technological possibility frontier (Kennedy,
1964; Samuelson, 1965). However, where Kaldor failed ultimately to present
a real alternative and Kennedy c.s. addressed a partial problem, the model
approach by Scott fits into the new growth theory.
The approach preferred in the present paper implies that the produc-
tion function in ils traditional static setting is not taken into account. The
elimination of the production function has nothing to do with the capital
debate that dominated the Cambridge-Cambridge discussion ot the seven-
ties. Nevertheless, the problem of the fitnctional distribution of income will
be an itnportant issue in the analysis to cotne. The thmry of endogenoue
growth developed in this paper puts the distribution problem in a proper,
that is to say, a dynamic perspective.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we derive
a formal model of economic growth from micrceconomic principles. The
determinants of steady state growth are examined in Section 3 by working
out the comparative statics of the model. In Section 4 it is assumed that the
labour market does not clear immediately but adjusts over time according
to some well-known theories. Under this assumption the model exhibits
transition dynamics, which can be illustrated by numerical examples as the
moclel proves to be saddlepoint stable. Conclusions and suggestions for
further research along the lines set out in this paper are presented in Section
5.
- r For a comparieon of neodasaical theory, endogenous growth theory and the work of
Scott, see van de Klundert (1990).3
2 A growth model based on microfoundations
At each point in time production (y), employment (!) and the real wage
rate (w) are predetermined variables. Firms can change their environment
by investing in new capital goods or by spending money to alter existing
equipment. By doing so output and employment can be changed. Usually
output will increase, but employment may go either way. If firms expect real
wages to rise fast it may be profitable to invest in labour savingexpansions of
production capacity ("defensive investment"). In the opposite situation oía
moderate wage increase firms will invest in a more oSensive way or, as Lam-
falussy (]961) suggested some time ago, engage in "enterprise investment".
Following Scott (1989) investment is taken gross of depreciation, because
the tot.al amount matters in creative destruction to paraphrase Schumpeter
(1934). llepreciation of existing eyuipment, as quasi-rents bcrome zcro, is
of no relevance, because it is a byproduct of economic growth. Or to put
it differently, economic growth is always concerned with qualitative change.
New vintages of capital goods drive out old existing ones. There may be
ways to add machines and equipment of different kinds, but the qucstion
is whether such a concept of capital is useful for an analysis oí economic
growth.
To confine attention to only two dimensions we consider rates of change
of output per unit ratio of investment expenditure (o) and rates of change
o(cmployment per unit ratio of investment expenditure (~), where g,g~ and
o denote respectively the growth rate of output (y), the rate of change in
employment (l) and the ratio of gross investment to output (o - y). The
investment possibility function (IPF) reads:
ó- 9(o)Í
lo' 9(a)J ' f~ ~ 0, f" C 0 (2.1)
'1'he snb-function q(a) is decrcasing in o, so that there are diminishing re-
turus with respect to o : rr(o) C 0, q"(o) ~ 0. E'or given values of o it is
possible to draw investment programme contours (IPC's) as shown in Figure
I. Iligher values of n correspond to lower IPC's, because of diminishing re-
turns. h~ach IPC shows a concave relation between ó and ~ indicating that
it becomes increasingly more difficult to raise the labour intensity of per
ratio unit of investment expenditure. For a given change in o the IPC shifts
iso-elastic along rays from the origin. 'I'he variable q, which may be calledthc radius of the IPC, decreases wiUi a positive change in the investment
ratio.
The IPF is based on the view that investment leads to change and change
is essential to learning. Invention can be seen as a form of investment de-
tetmined by its profitability. There may be learning externalities, becauae
firms may learn from investments undertaken by others. Such externalities
should be taken into account if the welfare implications of the theory are
considered. To simplify matters and concentrate on the essentials we do not
pursue this question for the time being.
Insert: Figure l.
Firms maximise the value of the firm over an infinite horizon for given
time paths of real wages (w) and real interest rates (r). It is assumed that
markets are characterised by monopolistic competition. Each firm faces a
downward sloping demand curve and chooses its optimal price and quantity
independent of the actions of its competitors. There may be different ways
to model imperfect competition in a general equilibrium framework. A nice
example is Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), where each firm sells its own
commodity variety in an otherwise symmetric world. Cooper and John
(1988) stress the role played by the number of firms in markets with an
homogeneous product. Here, we employ a short-cut by simply postulating a
downward sloping demand curve p- p(y) for the representative firm. The
relative price p is of course equal to unity because all firms are in the same
position ultimately. Omitting time subscripts the cash flow in real terms is:
yp(y) - Iw - i. The firm's decision problem can therefore be formiilated as
~ s
{Ma„} v- f ~{Yn(y) - rw - vy} ezp[- ~ r(s)ds) a~ (2.2)




where yw denotes the exogenously given rate of change of real wages. The
Hamiltonian for the present maximisation problem is
~ - YP(y) - Iw - oy -~ ~{ á - 9(o)J [~I 9(0)~ )
f~Gr9Y f ~Gx(9w t 9~)lw (2.6)
1'he letter ~ denotes a Lagrangean multiplier aesociated with the investment
possibility function (2.1), while ~pt and ~pa are costate variables associated
with the state variables output, y, and labour costs, !w.
The first order conditions are obtained by differentiating 7{ with respect
to the three instrurnent variables o,g and g~.
aH 9 9 9~(~) 9i 9i 9~(~) ~
80 - -y - ~{óy } 0 9(a) - ~o~ } o q(o) ~ f } - 0
~9 - ó f ~Gty - 0
~
á - -of f ~Gs(w - 0
Eliminating the Lagrangean multiplier { results in the conditions
f~ - - ~z X
~Gt






where a-~- denotes the share of labour in income and X--'q~~ denotes
the positivery defined elasticity of the radius with respect to the investment
ratio. As can easily bc shown g 1 grl~ and ~pl ~ 0. The elasticity of thes
radius should therefore be smaller than one (x G 1). Moreover, as (pl ~ 0
equation (2.10) implies y~2 G 0. The rates of change of the costate vaziables
are obtained in the usual way as




whcre rt in equation (2.12) is tbe ratio of marginal revenue to price. Assum-
ing a constant, positively defined, price elasticity of demand (e -- ydD ) and
setting the price at unity we derive rl - (1 - É) as a measure of the degree of
monopoly. It is assumed that c is larger than unity. If markets are perfect
rl - 1, otherwise we have rl G 1.
The interpretation of the costate variables is somewhat difficult, although
the expressions for y~r and ~p~ are intuitively appealing. The costate vari-
able y~~ shows the present atttactiveness of investment in terms of marginal
revenue versus consumption foregone, whereas cp2 signals the development
o( labour cost over time. Taking account of these interpretations it may be
said that condition (2.10) determines the investment strategy of the firm.
Relatively high labour costs in the future induce firms to select investment
programmes with a relatively high proportional marginal product of labour
(j'). Firms then opt for a defensive investment strategy. Thc extent of the
investment programme is governed by condition (2.11). A high value of ~pt
makes investment of given type (J' fixed) more attractive. But a high value
of ipr ceteris paribus induces firms also to accept relatively more oNensive
investment projects a.s appears from equation (2.10).
The representative household maximizes an additive separable intertem-
poral utility function. Instantaneous utility depends on the level ofconsump-
tion (c;). Labour supply is dealt with as an exogenous variable. Assuming a
constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution Q the household's decision
problem can be written as
c;-p
Max U- f ~~{-}exp(-at) dt, ~3 ~ 1 (2.14)
{~,} 0 1-Q
subjcxt to an intertemporal budget constraint, which can be formulated in
general termsai - rai - ~i (2.15)
where a; denotes household's total wealth and all labour income is fully
diversifiable. Human and non-human wealth are aggregated for convenience.




The rate ot growth of aggregate consumption (c) equals the sum of the rate
of growth of per capita consumption and the exogenous rate ofgrowth of the
number o( households: ~- ~ f g,,. Substitution of this relation in (2.16)
yiclds:
é r-a
~ - á } 9n (2.17)
Ignoring the public sector the equilibrium condition in the output market is
c-(1 - o)y. Taking account of this relation equation (2.17) can be rewrit-
ten as
ó a-r
1-0- p f(9-9n) (2.18)
To close the model we assume for the time being that the labour market
clears without delay:
9~ - 9n (2.19)
It may be useful to count equations and endogenous variables. The com-
plete model comprises the equations: (2.1), (2.10), (2.11), (2.12), (2.13),
(2.18) and (2.19) and solves for the variables g, g~, o, a, (pr, ~p2 and r. The
state variables y~~ and y~2 are non-predetermined. The economy has no
transitional dynamics and always jumps to a steady state in case of a dis-
turbance. The levels of output and employment follow from the definition
equations (2.3) and ('l.4) and predetermined values at an arbitrary starting
point.3 Determinants of economic growth
A steady state solution is obtained for y~~ - ~pz - ó- a- 0. Substitution
of these conditions in equations (2.12), (2.13) and (2.18) yields after some
manipulation the following results for a situation of balanced growth:
qn 1 ~ - ~~~(p)I 'o q(o)
r-a}(i(9-9n)
or-(rl-o)(1-X)(9-f~9n)}o9
a - (n - o)I'
(3.1)
Equations (3.1)-(3.4) can be used to solve for the steady-state (balanced
growth) values of g, o, a and r. A closed-form solution ie intractable. In-
stead, the comparative statics of the system aze studied by linearising the
model in the neighbourhood of a steady-state solution.
Substitution of equation (3.2) in equation (3.3) and combining the result
with equation (3.1) gives two equationa in two endogenous variables, viz. g
and o. Differentiation of the subsystem and applying matrix notation results
in
~}(1-A)o (1-X)Í~9n(1-~ó)}X9-r}~ d9 -
[ o -(1 - X)(9 - Í~9n) do -
~ ~Í~(1 - c1) - ~o o~,
o-(1 - X)(9 - Í~9n) 1. f da 1
0 0 1 IL dq
where by way of short-hand notation we have ~- (1 - X)(rl - o), ~-
(~ - r!)(9 - l~.qn)(1 } X- Ey)o, cl --~ and ca --~. The e's
are positively defined elasticities, which are a measure of U~e curvature of
respectively the IPC and the function q- q(a). F.mpirical work shows that
the IYC is rather flat, so that c~ is very small (Scott, 1989, chapters 10 and9
11). Notice that we did not differentiate with respect to ~3 to simplify the
analysis. 1'he solution of (3.5) can be written as
d9 -.1 Tii Tiz Tis f da J











- (1- x)~I'gf~ } (g - J'gn){(1- x)Aa } (x~ } o)f'
}~j' 1 X x(1 } x- c,)} } Xogn(I')z 1 0
- -(1 - X)(9 - f'gn)o G 0
- (1 - X)z(9 - f'9n)z ~ 0
- aj'~c~ } Q(1 - j')az } f'oz ~ 0
- -oz G 0
- 0(1 - X)(9 - f'gn) ~ 0
The signs ofthe expressions above are derived by assuming x G 1 and f' G 1.
The latter assumption is discussed in Scott (1989, p. 164). It implies that
the proportionate marginal product (for a given o) is always smaller than
one. Pure labour saving activities lead to a decline in output that is less
than proportionate, which seems a reasonable assumption. In addition, cq
should be small as may be assumed. A sufficient but overly strong condition
is cq G 1} X. Putting things together the system of equations in (3.6) yields:
d g ~ 0, da
G 0, dg ~ 0
9n rl
d o~ 0, da
G 0, do ~ 0
9n ~
An increase in the rate of growth of labour supply raises the growth rate oï10
output and the investment ratio ~. If diminishing returns are not too severe
labour productivity rises also: á-9~ I 3. A higher rate of time preference
corresponds with a lower rate of growth of output and a lower savings ratio.
Finally, more intensive competition between firms (a rise in rl) induces a
higher rate of growth along with a higher rate of investment.
It remains to be seen what effects these determinants of economic growth
have on the distribution of income. Total differentiation of equation (3.4)
leads to
r
da - j'dn -(n - o)cgn d9n f jr{ 1á X(rl - o)E7 - 1}da (3.8)
Assuming relatively flat sloping IPC's, so that c~ C 1-X~I~-ol holds, equa-
tion (3.8) gives in combination with the inequalities in (3.7):




Notice, thaL the main effect comes through o. A higher investment ratio goes
along with a Inwer share oflat~our in national income. Firms fix the share of
investmout in nal.iona.l product, bocause in an economy whore the long-run
growth rate depeuds on o Lhis is thr~ right instrument. Iluwever, a higher o
requires a lower a to be profitable, which brings the Kaldor-Pasinetti theory
of income distribution back to mind (Kaldor, 1956; Pasinetti, 1962). There
is neverthcless an important difference between these theories because cau-
sation is the other wav around. In the Kaldor-Pasinetti view differential
saving rates out of wages and capital income along with the required in-
vestment ratio determine the distribution of income. In the present theory
savings follow the Ramsey rule, but the required investment ratio lays a
claim on the cash flow of firms, which must be matched by the share going
~In models with non-decreaeing returna to capital and labour population growth leada
to an ever-increasing growth rate of the economy (e.g. Romer, 1989). This rather unap-
pealing result ia not obtained in lhe Scott model ss it is formulated in rate~ of change~
inatead of technological relations between levela of variablea.
31n the absence o[ diminishing returns to investment ( X - 0) labour productivity
increases a.v e~ - e)e q~ 1,9
dpy )i(~nio9J(J~ ) 1.11
to labour. Otherwise, the rate of return would be too low, so that savings
are insutficient compared with intended investments.
Things are different in casc q changes. A decline in the degree oÍ
monopoly (a rise in r)) has a direct positive effect on the share o[ labour
as appears from eyuation (3.8). There is also a positive effect on the invest-
ment ratio as shown in (3.7). The latter effect gives rise to a negative effect
on a for the same reason as given above. Which effect dominates remains to
be seen. Substitution of the expression for ~ from (3.6) in equation (3.8)
and rearranging results in
c
~-~~ - ó(s - I's„H~(1- x)(Q - 1) t(1 t x- Eq)1 X x t(1- x)~(n - o)~~}
f(1 - x)2(n- o)I'9„E,r ] ~ o (3.10)
A sufficient conclition for the ineyuality sign in (3.10) is ~3 1 1, which is
reasonahle frocn an empirical point of view (e.g. Scott, 1989). With a posi-
tive relation between a and q the redistribution effect dominates the growth
effect, provided that the elasticity otintertemporal substitution (l~p) is not
too high.
4 Labour market imperfections and growth dy-
namics
The assumption that the labour market clears without delay will be dropped
in this section. Our analysis differs in this respect from the usual setting in
growth theory, where prices (including the wage rate) are fully flexible and
markets cleat by adjustment in relative prices. In our view labour market
imperfections and real wage inertia matter as the economy is hit by shocks of
a diversc nature. It cnay then take substantial time to attain a new steady
state. Crowth thcory should considcr these mediwn term movetnents as
well as the long-run conseyuences of shocks and shifts in parameters (see
e.g. Stern, 19cJ1). Moreover, under certain conditions, which will be spelled
out later, the lahour ma.rket itself may be a determinant of the long-run
rate of growth. 'Paking account of recent theoretical developments, different12
forms of labonr market inertia will be considered which are summarised in
Lbr fnlluwing dyu:unic equation for tho ehare of labour in out.pnt.
a- Bia(9~ - 9n) - 92u f Ba~ (4.1)
where u-~~; ~ denotes unemployment as a percentage of labour supply (1')
and (-~a is a measure of union's desired shaze of labour in national
income relative to the actual share of labour. The dynamics of the model
are now governed by the differential equations (2.3), (2.4), (2.12) and (2.13).
With this system correspond five state variables, two o[ which are non-
predetermined (viz. y~l and ~p2) and the other three are predetermined (viz.
a, y and I or u). Equation (4.1) gives rise to the following taxonomy:
1. B~ - B3 - 0; BZ 1 0. The labour market adjusts fully in time accord-
ing t.o a standard Phillips curve mechanism, except that there is no
nominal wage rigidity as there is no money in the model. If there is
unemploycnent real wage growth falls behind the rise in labour pro-
ductivity and firms will invest in relatively more labour-using projects.
Besides the two positive roots associated with the costate variable ~pt
and ~p2 the model should now have two negative roots, so that it is
saddlepoint stable. The negative roots aze associated with the prede-
termined state variables ~ and 1(or u). In the long run the labour
market clears (a - 0 implies u- 0). Notice that there is an addi-
tional root which is equal to zero reftecting that the level of output
is path-dependent. Whether hysteresis is quantitatively important in
this case remains to be seen.
2. B~ ~ 0; B~ - B~ - 0. This is a pure insiders-outsiders model variant.
Real wages deviate from the path set by the rise in labour produc-
tivity under impact of changes in unemployment. Insiders opt for a
wage increase that warrants the existing level of employment, but may
fail to do so exactly because expectational errors must be taken into
account (e.g. Blanchard and Summers, 1986). Saddlepoint stability
is now ensured by two positive and one negative root, associated with
the predetermined variable a. In addition there are two zero roots,
associated with y and !(or u). As is well-known hysteresis phenomena
aze relevant in insider-outsider models of the type considered here.13
3. B~ - 0, B2 ~ 0, Bs ~ 0. This case corresponds to a labour union model
with (implicit) cost of adjustment with respect to wage changes. In a
monopoly union model wages are set in such a way that the welfare
of union members is ma~timised. As a consequence there will be a
trade-off between employment and labour income (e.g. Oswald, 1985;
Layard and Nickell, 1985, 1986). Cost of adjustment may prevent an
immediate response on impact of shocke. This idea is captured by
introducing an error correction mechanism à la Sazgan (1964). The
long-run trade-off between income and employment can be found by
setting a- 0 in equation (4.1):
B3 .~' - .~
u - Bi a
The share of labour in the steady state is determined by the factors
discussed in Section 3. I( unions opt for a higher share than the mar-
ket share (a' ~ a) there will be equilibrium unemployment as follows
from equation (4.2). 1{owever, this may not be the complete story. As
argued by Kalecki ( 1971, chapter 5) trade unions may influence the de-
gree oí monopoly. Powerful unions may tend to reduce profit margins
by wage claims, which reinforce competition. This view is ot course
disputable, but the basic idea may be given some consideration. After
all, the degree of monopoly may respond to different socio-economic
pressures. Kalecki's idea can be modelled by assuming a positive rela-
tion between degree of monopoly ( q) and the strength of union power
(~):
n- n(C), n~ o, n" ~ o
Finally, it should be obscrved that saddlepoint stability in the union
modcls requires two negative roots (aasociated with a and u) and two
positive roots (associated with ~r and ~p~). Moreover, there will again
be a zero root (associated with y).
A rlosed-form solution of the time paths of the endogenous variables is
intractable. 'l'he dynamic implications for the different forms of labour iner-
tia will therefore be illustrated by numerical simulations. The specificationsl.l
of Lhe funetions applied, the values of the parameters chosen and the initial
steady-state solutions are presented in the Appendix. In Section 4.1 we dis-
cuss the implications of a wage shock in the Phillips curve model and in the
insiders-outsidere model. A change in factors generating wage pressure in
the union model (e.g. Nickell, 1990) is dealt with in Section 4.2. In addition
to a discussion of the usual trade-ofi between employment and income we
pay attention to the Kalecki model by taking equation (4.3) into account.
9.1 A positive wage shock
'The effects of a wage push in the Phillips curve model (case 1) are presented
in Figure 2. All figures refer to deviations from the initial steady state value
of the variables expressed in percentage points. There is no unemployment
initially (u - 0). An additional increase in the real wage rate of 10 per-
centage points induces a rise in the share of labour of about 7 percentage
points on impact. Firms switch towards relatively more labour-saving in-
vestment projects. This implies a shift along the relevant IPC's to the left.
Thc rate of growth ofemployment declines and the resulting unemployment
puts a pressure on subseque.nt rises in the real wage rate. The gross rate
of investment declines after a small upward jump on impact, because the
profitability of firms is affected by the rise in a. The growth rate oí output
declines along with the fall in the growth rateof employment.
The system adjusts cyclical towards the initial steady state in which
there is no unemployment and the other variables shown attain their values
as given in the Appendix. There is one exception to this rule. The level of
output is path-dependent, implying that y falls by 0.12 per cent in the long
run. This result shows that hysteresis, although not absent, plays a minor
rule in the presented model. Cyclical adjustment seems inevitable as the
relevant instrument variable of the firm is the rate of growth o( employment
(g~) and not the level of employment (!). For the unemployment rate to
declinc, gi rnust excced its stesdy-state level, which occurs for the first time
at L- 9 as can be seen from Figure 3. From then on u declines until
employment growth falls again below its steady-state value at t- 37, etc.
Insert: Figure 2.
The results ofa similar wage push in case of the insiders-outsiders model
(case 2) are illustrated in Figure 3. There are a number of interesting dit-15
fereuces with the Phillips curve model. First, the savings and investment
ratio rises on impact and lies above its initial steady-state value during the
whole transition period. ilouseholds react to a decline in future income by
smoothing consumption over time, so that the rate of savinga rises in the
short run. Moreover, it pays to realiae more labour-saving projects and to
extend this strategy ovcr a longer time horizon. The reason is that in the
present ntodel rcal wages only adjust as long as the growth rate of employ-
ment lags behind the growth rate in labour supply. Second, in the new
steady state the rate of unemployment is about 6 per cent, while the level of
output declines by 5,5 per cent. This illustrates the relevance of hysteresis
in insiders-outsiders models of the labour market. Third, in contrast with
the Phillips curve model adjustment towards the steady state is monotone.
Fourth, the growth rate of output deviates from its ateady-state value over a
prolonged period ot time. Adverse supply shocks may therefore have a sub-
stantial impact on economic growth in the medium run if insiders-outsiders
effects are dominant in the labour market.
Insert: Figure 3.
4.2 A rise in union pressure
In a monopoly union model (case 3 discussed above) there is a number of fac-
tors generating wage pressure such as bargaining power, benefits, miematch
and the wedge between the product wage and the consumption wage. In our
model real wage pressure relates to the desired share of labour income (1') in
comparison with the market outcome (a). The efíects of a change in a' are
shown in Figure 4 4. Increased wage pressure leads to a rise in the growth
rate of real wages (gw). Firms change their investment strategy towards
relatively ntore labour-saving projects,so that employment decreases. The
shift towards labour-saving projects is marked by an increase in the savíngs
rate. }Iere again we have an example of a dynamic substitution process. It
pays to invest an extra amount to reduce the growth rate of employment.
As a result the growth rate o( output is somewhat less affected, as can be
~lt is assumed that a' increaeea by about 3.5 percentage pointa compazed with the
initial eteady etate. The initial eteady etate with a- a' diRere [rom the one in Section
4.1, becauee we now aeaume impertect competilion. For detaile eee the Appendiz.16
seen in Figure 4. The share of labour increases first, but the movement
is reversed as wage increases are moderated under the influence of rising
unemployment. The turning point is attained at t- 6.
Insert: Figure 4.
However, unemployment rises gradually towazds its equilibrium value u-
6.33q. [n the long run the other variables return to their initial steady-
state values. The long-run result of the model resemblea the outcome in the
Layard-Nickell model with mark-up pricing on the side of firms (see Layazd
and Nickell, 1985, 1986). With mark-up pricing real wages are fixed by
firms, so that competing claims between employers and unions can only be
reconciled by allowing unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon s. In
our model competing claims lead to a similaz result, because the activities
of firms determine the distribution of income in the long run.
The situation is different in the Kalecki model as it is assumed that
unions can foster competition between firms by increasing wage pressure.
The effects of a change in a' of the same magnitude as in the monopoly
union model are presented in Figure 5. At first the development is positive
(o,gi and g lie above their initial values) as competition is intensified. But
the share of labour rises in the course of time and firms shift towards labour-
saving investments. This causes some unemployment, which induces real
wage moderation. Finally, the economy settles at a new steady state, which
differs írom the initial solution in a number of respects. First, the rate of
growth is slightly higher. Second, the share of labour in national income
is also higher. Third, there is still equilibrium unemployment, but the rate
is substantially lower than in the monopoly union model, u- 1.68010. It
remains to be seen whether labour unions can activate the economy in such
a way and gain by realising a higher labour share in output. But the example
illustrates the role institutions may play in the process of economic growth.
As observed by Stern (1991) growth theory is in need of extensions in this
direction.
Insert: Figure 5.
~The competing daime model with mark-up pricing ie analyeed exteneively in Carlin
and Soxkice (1990).I7
5 Conclusions
In a inod~,ru tlimry nf eronomic Rrowth tbere is no ncrd fur a production
function in th~~ trxdilinual senso. If ~~vrry act uf iuv~~stiu~~nl fhallgCP the
world iu a yualitative way the distiuctiou betwcen wovernents aloug the
production function and shifts oC the function is blurred. This idea, which
goes back to Kaldor (1957) has recently been worked out in a seminal book
by Scott (1989). Existing production facilities aze an inheritance from the
past. They are what they are and to change thinga one has to invest. But
things can be changed in different directions. In case of defensive investment
emphasis is put on labour-savings. Output may grow, while at the same
time employment may be reduced. In a more offensive investment strategy
employment increases, so that output can grow relatively fast. A theory
based on an investment possibility function (IPF), which relates the share of
output invested (input) to the growth rates of commodities and employment
(output) is complete in the sense that it not only explains economic growth
but also the functional distribution ot income.
The results obtained by a theory based on the IPF correspond glob-
ally with those o( the new growth theory or endogenous growth theory aa
it is also called. The long-run growth rate in the economy depends on in-
tertemporal preferences of households and the growth rate of labour supply.
Distortionary taxation, although not explicitly taken into account here, will
have a negative impact on growth in the long run. Moreover, it has been
shown that the degree oí competition in product markets has an impact on
the steady-state solution of the model.
Assuming that the labour market clears immediately the economy has no
transitional dynamics. Morcover, the model exhibits some form o( hysteresis
as the rate ot output and the level of employment depend upon initial values.
The process of economic growth can be enriched by considering different
forms of labour market impertection and real wage inertia, which may give
rise t.o transitional dynamics. Economic growth in the medium run can
deviate substantially from its long-run course if the econorny is hit by shocks
and the labour market clears with a delay (as in the Phillips curve model)
or works imperfectly (as in the case of the insiders-outsiders model or the
maiopoly union model). In the paper we consider ahocks which emanate
from the labour market itself, but the story holds (or other shocks and
institutional changes as well.
7'he model is very flexible and can easily be extended in several direc-
tions. There are two topics on the research agenda, which have high priority.18
F'irst, the role of tbr govr~nnnent should be taken into account not only by
introducing taxes but also by analysing the significance uf productive gov-
ernment spending (see e.g. Scott, 1989; Barro, 1990). Second, after suitable
adaptious the model may be used to study the problems of developing coun-
tries in a world where divergence rather than convergence seems the ruling
situation.
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Appendix
Numerical simulation requires specification of functional torms, which de-
tennine the investment possibilities and a choice of parameter values for the
functions applied. To put things in a proper perspective we draw on the
empirical work of Scott (1989).
Equation (2.1) is specified as:
z
g- aoq t bgi - c~, with
aq
q- qo ~ 1- e-ryo 1, so that
ryo 1
X--9q' - 1- e7o 0 1




The parameter values applied are
Firms: a- 0.1085, b- 0.955, c- 0.4, ry- 6.0, qo - 2.0
Households: a- 0.03, p- 1.5
Labour market: g„ - 0.01, Br - 0,1.5, Bz - 0,0.25, B3 - 0,0.25
Product market: r) - 1,0.84281
Kalecki equation: w~ - 20, w2 - 0.15
Numerical results for the endogenous vaziables are obtained by solving a two-
point boundary-value problem. The algorithm used is a multiple-shooting
routine described in Ascher et al. (1988).
Steady state solution with períect competition (rl - 1)
g- 0.03795, g~ - 0.01, a- 0.25978
a- 0.68441, gw - 0.02795, r- 0.07193
~p~ - 21.78556, ~pZ - -29.43130, X - 0.58464
c~ - 0.03287, eq - 0.89261, f' - 0.924612
Real parts non-zero eigenvalues
1. P}iillilx~ curvc model (Bz - 0.25, BI - B3 - 0)
O.1553,0.044495,-0.05837,-0.05837
2. Insiders-outsiders model (B~ - 1.5, B~ - B3 - 0)
0.15113,0.042277,-0.11036
Steady-state solution with imperfect competition (q - 0.84281, a' - 0.60)
g- 0.03654, g~ - 0.01, o- 0.2315
a- 0.56426, g,,, - 0.02654, r- 0.06981
~p~ - 18.37456, y~z - -30.05738, X - 0.53866
e~ - 0.03464, cy - 0.81040, j' - 0.92303
Iteal parts non-zero eigenvalues




Figure 1. The Investment Programme Contours (IPC)
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